We provide a general framework for privacy-preserving variational Bayes (VB) for a large class of probabilistic models, called the conjugate exponential (CE) family. Our primary observation is that when models are in the CE family, we can privatise the variational posterior distributions simply by perturbing the expected sufficient statistics of the completedata likelihood. For widely used non-CE models with binomial likelihoods, we exploit the Pólya-Gamma data augmentation scheme to bring such models into the CE family, such that inferences in the modified model resemble the private variational Bayes algorithm as closely as possible. The iterative nature of variational Bayes presents a further challenge since iterations increase the amount of noise needed. We overcome this by combining: (1) a relaxed notion of differential privacy, called concentrated differential privacy, which provides a tight bound on the privacy cost of multiple VB iterations and thus significantly decreases the amount of additive noise; and (2) the privacy amplification effect of subsampling mini-batches from large-scale data in stochastic learning. We empirically demonstrate the effectiveness of our method in CE and non-CE models including latent Dirichlet allocation, Bayesian logistic regression, and sigmoid belief networks, evaluated on real-world datasets.
Introduction
Bayesian inference, which reasons over the uncertainty in model parameters and latent variables given data and prior knowledge, has found widespread use in data science application domains in which privacy is essential, including text analysis (Blei et al., 2003) , medical informatics (Husmeier et al., 2006) , and MOOCS (Piech et al., 2013) . In these applications, the goals of the analysis must be carefully balanced against the privacy concerns of the individuals whose data are being studied (Daries et al., 2014) . The recently proposed differential privacy (DP) formalism provides a means for analyzing and controlling this trade-off, by quantifying the privacy "cost" of data-driven algorithms (Dwork et al., 2006b) . In this work, we address the challenge of performing Bayesian inference in private settings, by developing an extension of the widely used Variational Bayes (VB) algorithm that preserves differential privacy.
Variational Bayes is an optimization-based approach to learning and inference which originates from the Expectation Maximisation (EM) algorithm for maximum likelihood and MAP estimation under models with latent variables (Dempster et al., 1977) . Since directly optimising the log likelihood of observations under such models is intractable, EM introduces a probability distribution over the latent variables, which gives rise to a lower bound on the log likelihood. To estimate the parameters, EM iteratively alternates between optimising the lower bound, and improving it.
In many modern statistical machine learning applications, multiple latent variables are used with complex dependency structures between them, which frequently results in intractable posterior distributions over the latent variables. For such cases, variational EM (VEM) introduces a particular tractable form for the posterior distributions, e.g., factorised over the latent variables, and optimises the lower bound as a function of those constrained distributions. A fully Bayesian extension of the variational EM algorithm is called variational Bayesian EM (VBEM) (Beal, 2003) , in which latent variables as well as model parameters are treated as random variables and their posteriors are learned by optimising the lower bound. While VBEM has a somewhat similar algorithmic structure to (variational) EM, it aims to compute a fundamentally different object: an approximation to the entire posterior distribution, instead of a point estimate of the parameters. VBEM thereby provides an optimization-based alternative to Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) simulation methods for Bayesian inference, and as such, frequently has faster convergence properties than corresponding MCMC methods. We refer to the VEM and VBEM methods collectively as variational Bayes.
While the variational Bayes algorithm proves its usefulness by successfully solving many statistical problems, the standard form of the variational Bayes algorithm unfortunately cannot guarantee privacy for each individual in the dataset. Differential privacy (DP) (Dwork et al., 2006b ) is a formalism which can be used to establish such guarantees. An algorithm is said to preserve differential privacy if its output is sufficiently noisy or random to obscure the participation of any single individual in the data. By showing that an algorithm satisfies the differential privacy criterion, we are guaranteed that an adversary cannot draw new conclusions about an individual from the output of the algorithm, by virtue of his/her participation in the dataset. However, the injection of noise into an algorithm, in order to satisfy the DP definition, generally results in a loss of statistical efficiency, as measured by accuracy per sample in the dataset. To design practical differentially private machine learning algorithms, the central challenge is to design a noise injection mechanism such that there is a good trade-off between privacy and statistical efficiency.
Iterative algorithms such as variational Bayes pose a further challenge, when developing a differentially private algorithm: each iteration corresponds to a query to the database which must be privatised, and the number of iterations required to guarantee accurate posterior estimates causes high cumulative privacy loss. To compensate for the loss, one needs to add a significantly high level of noise to the quantity of interest. We overcome these challenges using the following key innovations:
• Perturbation of the expected sufficient statistics: Our first observation is that when models are in the conjugate exponential (CE) family, we can privatise variational posterior distributions simply by perturbing the expected sufficient statistics of the complete-data likelihood. This allows us to make effective use of the per iteration privacy budget in each step of the algorithm.
• Refined composition analysis: In order to use the privacy budget more effectively across many iterations, we calculate the cumulative privacy cost by using an improved composition analysis, leveraging a relaxed notion of differential privacy, called concentrated differential privacy (CDP) (Dwork and Rothblum, 2016) . Specifically, a variant of CDP, called zCDP (Bun and Steinke, 2016) , bounds the moments of the privacy loss random variable. The moments bound yields a tighter tail bound, and consequently, for a given total privacy budget, allows for a higher per-iteration budget than standard methods, after converting the zCDP privacy budget parameters back to corresponding DP parameters.
• Privacy amplification effect from subsampling of large-scale data: In the big data setting, processing the entire dataset in each iteration is extremely expensive, or even impossible in some cases. Stochastic learning algorithms provide a scalable alternative, by performing parameter updates based on subsampled mini-batches of data. This subsampling procedure, in fact, has a further benefit of amplifying privacy.
Our results show that subsampling works synergistically in concert with zCDP composition to make effective use of an overall privacy budget. While there are several prior works on differentially private algorithms in stochastic learning (e.g. Bassily et al. (2014) ; Song et al. (2013) ; Wang et al. (2015) ; Wu et al. (2016) ), the use of privacy amplification due to subsampling, in combination with CDP composition, has not been used in the the context of variational Bayes before.
• Data augmentation for the non-CE family models: For widely used non-CE models with binomial likelihoods such as logistic regression, we exploit the Pólya-Gamma data augmentation scheme (Polson et al., 2013) to bring such models into the CE family, such that inferences in the modified model resemble our private variational Bayes algorithm as closely as possible. Unlike recent work which involves perturbing and clipping gradients for privacy (Jälkö et al., 2016) , our method uses an improved composition method, and also maintains the closed-form updates for the variational posteriors and the posterior over hyper-parameters, and results in an algorithm which is more faithful to the standard CE variational Bayes method. Several papers have used the Pólya-Gamma data augmentation method in order to perform Bayesian inference, either exactly via Gibbs sampling (Polson et al., 2013) , or approximately via variational Bayes (Gan et al., 2015) . However, this augmentation technique has not previously been used in the context of differential privacy.
Taken together, these innovations result in an algorithm for privacy-preserving variational Bayesian inference that is both practical and very broadly applicable. Our private VB algorithm makes effective use of the privacy budget, both per iteration and across multiple iterations, and with further improvements in the stochastic variational inference setting. Our algorithm is also extremely general, and applies to the broad class of CE family models, as well as non-CE models with binomial likelihoods.
We organise the remainder of this paper as follows. First, we review relevant background information on differential privacy, privacy-preserving Bayesian inference, and variational Bayes in Sec. 2. We then introduce our novel general framework of private variational Bayes in Sec. 3 and illustrate how to apply that general framework to the latent Dirichlet allocation model in Sec. 4. In Sec. 5, we introduce the Pólya-Gamma data augmentation scheme for non-CE family models, and we then illustrate how to apply our private variational Bayes algorithm to Bayesian logistic regression (Sec. 6) and sigmoid belief networks (Sec. 7). Lastly, we summarise our paper and provide future directions in Sec. 8.
Background
In this section, we provide background information on the definitions of algorithmic privacy that we use, how to design a differentially private algorithm, and the composition techniques that we use. We also provide related work on privacy-preserving Bayesian inference, as well as the general formulation of the variational inference algorithm.
Differential privacy
Differential privacy (DP) is a formal definition of the privacy properties of data analysis algorithms (Dwork and Roth, 2014) . A randomized algorithm M(X) is said to be ( , δ)-differentially private if
for all measurable subsets S of the range of M and for all datasets X, X differing by a single entry (either by excluding that entry or replacing it with a new entry). If δ = 0, the algorithm is said to be -differentially private, and if δ > 0, it is said to be approximately differentially private. Intuitively, the definition states that the probability of any event does not change very much when a single individual's data is modified, thereby limiting the amount of information that the algorithm reveals about any one individual.
Designing differentially private algorithms
There are several standard approaches for designing differentially-private algorithmssee Dwork and Roth (2014) and for surveys. The classical approach is output perturbation by Dwork et al. (2006b) , where the idea is to add noise to the output of a function computed on sensitive data. The most common form of output perturbation is the global sensitivity method by Dwork et al. (2006b) , where the idea is to calibrate the amount of noise added to the global sensitivity of the function.
Recall that the global sensitivity of a function F of a dataset X is defined as the maximum amount (over all datasets X) by which F changes when the private value of a single individual in X changes. Specifically,
where X is allowed to vary over the entire data domain, and | · | can correspond to either the L1 norm or the L2 norm, depending on the noise mechanism used.
In this paper, we consider a specific form of the global sensitivity method, called the Gaussian Mechanism (Dwork et al., 2006a) , where Gaussian noise calibrated to the global sensitivity is added. Specifically, for a function F with global sensitivity ∆F , we output:
and where ∆F is computed using the L2 norm, and is referred to as the L2 sensitivity of the function F . The privacy properties of this method are illustrated in (Dwork and Roth, 2014; Bun and Steinke, 2016; Dwork and Rothblum, 2016) . A variation of the global sensitivity method is the smoothed sensitivity method (Nissim et al., 2007) , where the standard deviation of the added noise depends on the sensitive dataset, and is less when the dataset is well-behaved. How to compute the smoothed sensitivity in a tractable manner is a major challenge, and efficient computational procedures are known only for a small number of relatively simple tasks.
A second, different approach is the exponential mechanism (McSherry and Talwar, 2007), a generic procedure for privately solving an optimization problem where the objective depends on sensitive data. The exponential mechanism outputs a sample drawn from a density concentrated around the (non-private) optimal value; this method too is computationally inefficient in general. A third approach is objective perturbation (Chaudhuri et al., 2011b) , where an optimization problem is perturbed by adding a (randomly drawn) term and its solution is output; while this method applies easily to convex optimization problems such as those that arise in logistic regression and SVM, it is unclear how to apply it to more complex optimization problems that arise in the context of Bayesian inference.
A final approach for designing differentially private algorithms is sample-and-aggregate (Nissim et al., 2007) , where the goal is to boost the amount of privacy offered by running private algorithms on subsamples, and then aggregating the result. In this paper, we use a combination of output perturbation along with sample-and-aggregate.
Composition
An important property of differential privacy which makes it conducive to real applications is composition, which means that the privacy guarantees decay gracefully as the same private dataset is used in multiple releases. The first composition result was established by Dwork et al. (2006b) and Dwork et al. (2006a) , who showed that differential privacy composes linearly; if we use differentially private algorithms A 1 , . . . , A k with privacy parameters ( 1 , δ 1 ), . . . , ( k , δ k ) then the resulting process is ( k k , k δ k )-differentially private. This result was improved by Dwork et al. (2010) to provide a better rate for ( , δ)-differential privacy. Kairouz et al. (2013) improves this even further, and provides a characterization of optimal composition for any differentially private algorithm.
In this paper, we use composition results due to Bun and Steinke (2016) that are inspired by concentrated differential privacy, a variant of differential privacy. As our experiments illustrate, these methods yield better performance than Dwork et al. (2010) ; moreover, unlike the result in Kairouz et al. (2013) , they are tailored to the specific algorithms that we use, and have relatively simple forms, which makes the privacy parameter calculations fast and easy.
Concentrated differential privacy (CDP) (Dwork and Rothblum, 2016 ) is a recently proposed relaxation of differential privacy which aims to make privacy-preserving iterative algorithms more practical than for DP while still providing strong privacy guarantees. The CDP framework treats the privacy loss of an outcome,
as a random variable. There are two variants of CDP. First, in (µ, τ )-mCDP (Dwork and Rothblum, 2016) , L (o) subtracted by its mean µ is subgaussian with standard deviation
Second, in τ -zCDP (Bun and Steinke, 2016) , which arises from a connection between the moment generating function of L (o) and the Rényi divergence between the distributions of M (X) and that of M (X ) , we require:
is also subgaussian but zeromean.
In this work, we will use a composition technique that is motivated by zCDP rather than mCDP, since many DP and approximate DP mechanisms can be characterised in terms of zCDP, but not in terms of mCDP without a large loss in privacy parameters. This correspondence will allow us to use zCDP as a tool for analyzing composition under the standard ( , δ)-DP privacy definition, for a fair comparison between CDP and DP analyses. 1 In zCDP, composition is straightfoward since the Rényi divergence between two product distributions is simply the sum of the Rényi divergences of the marginals. The growth in the Rényi divergence corresponds to the growth in the moment generating function of L (o) over iterations. Using the bound on the moment generating function, zCDP achieves a tighter tail bound than standard composition methods, yielding a higher per-iteration privacy budget than standard methods for a given total budget.
Note that the moments accountant (MA) method developed by (Abadi et al., 2016 ) also exploits the moment bound (the growth in the moment generating function of L (o) over iterations), which is converted to a tight tail bound. Although zCDP and MA started from a different viewpoint, both yield a very similar per-iteration privacy budget for a given total budget. See Park et al. (2016) for comparison between the two in the expectation maximisation (EM) setting. In this paper, we will use the zCDP composition rather than MA, due to the simplicity when computing the per-iteration budget (See Sec.3.2).
Privacy-preserving Bayesian inference
Privacy-preserving Bayesian inference is a new research area which is currently receiving a lot of attention. Dimitrakakis et al. (2014) showed that Bayesian posterior sampling is automatically differentially private, under a mild sensitivity condition on the log likelihood. This result was independently discovered by Wang et al. (2015) , who also showed that the stochastic gradient Langevin dynamics (SGLD) Bayesian inference algorithm (Welling and Teh, 2011) automatically satisfies approximate differential privacy, due to the use of Gaussian noise in the updates.
As an alternative to obtaining privacy "for free" from posterior sampling, studied a Laplace mechanism approach for exponential family models, and proved that it is asymptotically efficient, unlike the former approach. Independently of this work, proposed an equivalent Laplace mechanism method for private Bayesian inference in the special case of beta-Bernoulli systems, including graphical models constructed based on these systems. further analyzed privacy-preserving MCMC algorithms, via both exponential and Laplace mechanism approaches.
In terms of approximate Bayesian inference, Jälkö et al. (2016) recently considered privacy-preserving variational Bayes via perturbing and clipping the gradients of the variational lower bound. However, this work focuses its experiments on logistic regression, a model that does not have latent variables. Given that most latent variable models consist of at least as many latent variables as the number of datapoints, the long vector of gradients (the concatenation of the gradients with respect to the latent variables; and with respect to the model parameters) in such cases is expected to typically require excessive amounts of additive noise. Furthermore, our approach, using the data augmentation scheme (see Sec. 5) and moment perturbation, yields closed-form posterior updates (posterior distributions both for latent variables and model parameters) that are closer to the spirit of the original variational Bayes method, for both CE and non-CE models, as well as an improved composition analysis using zCDP.
In recent work, Barthe et al. (2016) designed a probabilistic programming language for designing privacy-preserving Bayesian machine learning algorithms, with privacy achieved via input or output perturbation, using standard mechanisms.
Lastly, although it is not a fully Bayesian method, it is worth noting the differentially private expectation maximisation algorithm developed by Park et al. (2016) , which also involves perturbing the expected sufficient statistics for the complete-data likelihood. The major difference between our and their work is that EM is not (fully) Bayesian, i.e., EM outputs the point estimates of the model parameters; while VB outputs the posterior distributions (or those quantities that are necessary to do Bayesian predictions, e.g., expected natural parameters and expected sufficient statistics). Furthermore, Park et al. (2016) deals with only CE family models for obtaining the closed-form MAP estimates of the parameters; while our approach encompasses both CE and non-CE family models. Lastly, Park et al. (2016) demonstrated their method on small-to medium-sized datasets, which do not require stochastic learning; while our method takes into account the scenario of stochastic learning which is essential in the era of big data (Hoffman et al., 2013) .
Variational Bayes
Consider a generative model that produces a dataset D = {D n } N n=1 consisting of N independent identically distributed (i.i.d.) items (D n is the nth input/output pair {x n , y n } for supervised learning, and D n is the nth vector output y n for unsupervised learning), generated using a set of latent variables l = {l n } N n=1 . The generative model provides p(D n |l n , m), where m are the model parameters. We also consider the prior distribution over the model parameters p(m) and the prior distribution over the latent variables p(l ). We describe the general framework of variational Bayes (VB) in the following. Our discussion is focused on the variational Bayesian EM (VBEM) variant algorithm. The goal of the algorithm is to compute an approximation q(l , m) to the posterior distribution over latent variables and model parameters for models where exact posterior inference is intractable. This should be contrasted to VEM and EM, which aim to compute a point estimate of m. VEM and EM can both be understood as special cases, in which the set of q(l , m) distributions is constrained such that the approximate posterior over m is a delta function.
VB for CE models VB simplifies to a two-step procedure when the model falls into the conjugate-exponential (CE) class of models, which satisfy two conditions (Beal, 2003) :
(1) The complete-data likelihood is in the exponential family :
(2) The prior over m is conjugate to the complete-data likelihood :
where natural parameters and sufficient statistics of the complete-data likelihood are denoted by n(m) and s(D n , l n ), respectively. The hyperparameters are denoted by τ (a scalar) and ν (a vector).
A large class of models fall in the CE family. Examples include linear dynamical systems and switching models; Gaussian mixtures; factor analysis and probabilistic PCA; hidden Markov models (HMM) and factorial HMMs; and discrete-variable belief networks. The models that are widely used but not in the CE family include: Markov random fields (MRFs) and Boltzmann machines; logistic regression; sigmoid belief networks; and independent component analysis (ICA). We illustrate how best to bring such models into the CE family in a later section.
The VB algorithm for a CE family model optimises the model log marginal likelihood given by
where we assume that the joint approximate posterior distribution over the latent variables and model parameters q(l , m) is factorised as
and that each of the variational distributions also has the form of an exponential family distribution. Computing the derivatives of the variational lower bound in Eq. 5 with respect to each of these variational distributions and setting them to zero yields the following two-step procedure.
(1) First, given expected natural parametersn, the E-step computes :
Using q(l ), it outputs expected sufficient statistics:
(2) Second, given expected sufficient statisticss(D), the M-step computes :
Using q(m), it outputs expected natural parametersn = n(m) q(m) .
Stochastic VB for CE models The VB update introduced in Eq. 7 is inefficient for large data sets because we should optimise the variational posterior over the latent variables corresponding to each data point before re-estimating the variational posterior over the parameters. For more efficient learning, we adopt stochastic variational inference, which uses stochastic optimisation to fit the variational distribution over the parameters. We repeatedly subsample the data to form noisy estimates of the natural gradient of the variational lower bound, and we follow these estimates with a decreasing step-size ρ t , as in Hoffman et al. (2013) . 2 The stochastic variational Bayes algorithm is summarised in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 (Stochastic) Variational Bayes for CE family distributions
Input: Data D. Define ρ t = (τ 0 + t) −κ and mini-batch size S. Output: Expected natural parametersn and expected sufficient statisticss. for t = 1, . . . , J do (1) E-step: Given the expected natural parametersn, compute q(l n ) for n = 1, . . . , S.
Output the expected sufficient statisticss =
. Output the expected natural parametersn = m q(m) . end for
Variational Bayes in private settings (VIPS) for CE family
To create an extension of variational Bayes which preserves differential privacy, we need to inject noise into the algorithm. The design choices for the noise injection procedure must be carefully made, as they can strongly affect the statistical efficiency of the algorithm, in terms of its accuracy versus the number of samples in the dataset. We start by introducing our problem setup.
2. When optimising over a probability distribution, the Euclidean distance between two parameter vectors is often a poor measure of the dissimilarity of the distributions. The natural gradient of a function accounts for the information geometry of its parameter space, using a Riemannian metric to adjust the direction of the traditional gradient, which results in a faster convergence than the traditional gradient (Hoffman et al., 2013) .
Problem setup
A naive way to privatise the VB algorithm is by perturbing both q(l ) and q(m). Unfortunately, this is impractical, due to the excessive amounts of additive noise (recall: we have as many latent variables as the number of datapoints). We propose to perturb the expected sufficient statistics only. What follows next explains why this makes sense. While the VB algorithm is being run, the places where the algorithm needs to look at the data are (1) when computing the variational posterior over the latent variables q(l ); and (2) when computing the expected sufficient statisticss(D) given q(l ) in the E-step. In our proposed approach, we compute q(l ) behind the privacy wall (see below), and compute the expected sufficient statistics using q(l ), as shown in Fig. 1 . Before outputting the expected sufficient statistics, we perturb each coordinate of the expected sufficient statistics to compensate the maximum difference in s l (D j , l j ) q(l j ) caused by both D j and q(l j ). The perturbed expected sufficient statistics then dictate the expected natural parameters in the M-step. Hence we do not need an additional step to add noise to q(m).
The reason we neither perturb nor output q(l ) for training data is that we do not need q(l ) itself most of the time. For instance, when computing the predictive probability for test datapoints D tst , we need to perform the E-step to obtain the variational posterior for the test data q(l tst ), which is a function of the test data and the expected natural parameters n, given as
where the dependence on the training data D is implicit in the approximate posteriors q(m) throughν; and the expected natural parametersn. Hence, outputting the perturbed sufficient statistics and the expected natural parameters suffice for protecting the privacy of individuals in the training data. Furthermore, the M-step can be performed based on the (privatised) output of the E-step, without querying the data again, so we do not need to add any further noise to the M-step to ensure privacy, due to the fact that differential privacy is immune to data-independent post-processing. To sum up, we provide our problem setup as below.
1. Privacy wall: We assume that the sensitive training dataset is only accessible through a sanitising interface which we call a privacy wall. The training data stay behind the privacy wall, and adversaries have access to the outputs of our algorithm only, i.e., no direct access to the training data, although they may have further prior knowledge on some of the individuals that are included in the training data.
2. Training phase: Our differentially private VB algorithm releases the perturbed expected natural parameters and perturbed expected sufficient statistics in every iteration. We spend the per-iteration privacy budget (see Sec 3.2) whenever we look at the training data in every iteration.
3. Test phase: Test data are public (or belong to users), i.e., outside the privacy wall.
Bayesian prediction on the test data is possible using the released expected natural parameters and expected sufficient statistics (given as Eq. 9). Note that we do not consider protecting the privacy of the individuals in the test data. , we compute the variational posterior over the latent variables q(l ). Since q(l ) is a function of not only the expected natural parameters but also the data D, we compute q(l ) behind the privacy wall. Using q(l ), we then compute the expected sufficient statistics. Note that we neither perturb nor output q(l ) itself. Instead, when we noise up the expected sufficient statistics before outputting, we add noise to each coordinate of the expected sufficient statistics in order to compensate the maximum difference in s l (D j , l j ) q(l j ) caused by both D j and q(l j ). In the M-step, we compute the variational posterior over the parameters q(m) using the perturbed expected sufficient statisticss (1) . Using q(m), we compute the expected natural parametersñ (1) , which is already perturbed since it is a function ofs (1) . We continue performing these two steps until convergence.
How much noise to add?
How much noise one needs to add to the expected sufficient statistics depends both on a sensitivity of the expected sufficient statistics and an allowed per-iteration privacy budget.
Sensitivity analysis Suppose there are two neighbouring datasets D and D , where D has one entry less compared to D (i.e., by removing one entry from D). 3 We denote the vector of expected sufficient statistics bys(
, where each expected sufficient statistic M l is given by
When computing the sensitivity of the expected sufficient statistics, we assume, without loss of generality, the last entry removed from D maximises the difference in the expected sufficient statistics run on the two datasets D and D . Under this assumption and the i.i.d. assumption on the likelihood, given the current expected natural parametersn, all q(l i ) and s l (D i , l i ) for i ∈ {1, . . . , N − 1} evaluated on the dataset D are the same as q(l i ) and
Hence, the sensitivity is given by
where the last line is because the average (over the N −1 terms) expected sufficient statistics is less than equal to the maximum expected sufficient statistics (recall: we assumed that the last entry maximises the difference in the expected sufficient statistics), i.e.,
As in many existing works (e.g., (Chaudhuri et al., 2011b; Kifer et al., 2012) , among many others), we also assume that the dataset is pre-processed such that the L 2 norm of any D i is less than 1. Furthermore, we choose q(l i ) such that q(l i ) is bounded. Under these conditions, each coordinate of the expected sufficient statistics s l (D i , l i ) q(l i ) has limited sensitivity. We will add noise to each coordinate of the expected sufficient statistics to compensate this bounded maximum change in the E-step.
Per-iteration privacy budget Our method calculates the per-iteration budget using the privacy amplification effect from subsampling of data as well as several key properties of zCDP. The version of the privacy amplification theorem we use is as follows. A similar theorem, but with slightly worse guarantees, that applies to a slightly different version of differential privacy, has also been established by Kasiviswanathan et al. (2011) .
Theorem 1 (Theorem 1 in (Li et al., 2012) ) Any ( iter , δ iter )-DP mechanism running on a sampled subset of the data, where each data point is included independently with probability ν, and where ν > δ iter , guarantees (log(1 + ν(exp( iter ) − 1)), νδ iter )-differential privacy.
Note the subsampling procedure in Theorem 1, in which each example is included in a minibatch according to an independent coin flip with probability ν. This differs slightly from the standard approach for stochastic gradient methods, in which a fixed minibatch size S is typically used in each iteration. However, following Abadi et al. (2016) , for simplicity of analysis, we will also assume that the instances are included independently with probability ν = S N ; and for ease of implementation, we will use minibatches with fixed size S in our experiments. So, in each iteration, perturbing each coordinate ofs =
computed on a subsampled mini-batch with ratio ν by adding Gaussian noisẽ
guarantees ( , δ )-DP, where
The privacy gain from subsampling allows us to use a much more relaxed privacy budget iter and the error tolerance δ iter per iteration, to achieve a reasonable level of ( , δ )-DP with a small sampling rate. Furthermore, the zCDP composition allows a sharper analysis of the per-iteration privacy budget. We first convert DP to zCDP, then use the zCDP composition and finally convert zCDP back to DP (for comparison purposes), for which we use the following lemmas and proposition.
Lemma 2 (Proposition 1.6 in (Bun and Steinke, 2016 )) The Gaussian mechanism with some noise variance τ and a sensitivity ∆ satisfies ∆ 2 /(2τ )-zCDP.
Lemma 3 (Lemma 1.7 in (Bun and Steinke, 2016) ) If two mechanisms satisfy ρ 1 -zCDP and ρ 2 -zCDP, respectively, then their composition satisfies (ρ 1 + ρ 2 )-zCDP.
Proposition 4 (Proposition 1.3 in (Bun and Steinke, 2016) ) If M provides ρ-zCDP, then M is (ρ + 2 ρ log(1/δ), δ)-DP for any ρ > 0.
So, using Lemma 2 and 3, we obtain J∆ 2 /(2τ )-zCDP after J-composition of the Gaussian mechanism. Using Proposition 4, we convert J∆ 2 /(2τ )-zCDP to (ρ + 2 ρ log(1/δ), δ)-DP, where ρ = J∆ 2 /(2τ ).
These seemingly complicated steps can be summarised into two simple steps. First, given a total privacy budget tot and total tolerance level δ tot , our algorithm calculates an intermediate privacy budget using the zCDP composition, which maps ( tot , δ tot ) to ( , δ ),
Second, our algorithm calculates the per-iteration privacy budget using the privacy amplification theorem, which maps ( , δ ) to ( iter , δ iter ), Step 1 (zCDP composition) : solve Eq. 15 for ( , δ ), given ( tot , δ tot ) and J
Step 2 (privacy amplification) : solve Eq. 16 for ( iter , δ iter ), given ( , δ ) and ν Algorithm 2 summarizes our VIPS algorithm that performs differentially private stochastic variational Bayes for CE family models.
Algorithm 2 ( tot , δ tot )-DP VIPS for CE family distributions
Input: Data D. Define ρ t = (τ 0 + t) −κ , mini-batch size S, and maximum iterations J. Output: Perturb expected natural parametersñ and expected sufficient statisticss.
Compute the per-iteration privacy budget ( iter , δ iter ) as described in Table 1 .
Compute the sensitivity of the expected sufficient statistics. for t = 1, . . . , J do (1) E-step: Given the expected natural parametersn, compute q(l n ) for n = 1, . . . , S.
Perturb each coordinate ofs = 1 S S n=1 s(D n , l n ) q(l n) by Eq. 13, and outputs. (2) M-step: Givens, compute q(m) byν (t) = ν+Ns. Setν (t) ← (1−ρ t )ν (t−1) +ρ tν (t) . Output the expected natural parametersñ = m q(m) . end for
VIPS for latent Dirichlet allocation
Here, we illustrate how to use the general framework of VIPS for CE family in the example of latent Dirichlet allocation (LDA).
Model specifics in LDA
The most widely used topic model is latent Dirichlet allocation (LDA) (Blei et al., 2003) . Its generative process is given by
• Draw topics β k ∼ Dirichlet (η1 V ), for k = {1, . . . , K}, where η is a scalar hyperarameter.
• For each document d ∈ {1, . . . , D} -Draw topic proportions θ d ∼ Dirichlet (α1 K ), where α is a scalar hyperarameter.
-For each word n ∈ {1, . . . , N } * Draw topic assignments
where each observed word is represented by an indicator vector w dn (nth word in the dth document) of length V , and where V is the number of terms in a fixed vocabulary set. The topic assignment latent variable z dn is also an indicator vector of length K, where K is the number of topics. The LDA model falls in the CE family, viewing z d,1:N and θ d as two types of latent variables: l d = {z d,1:N , θ d }, and β as model parameters m = β. The conditions for CE are satisfied: (1) the complete-data likelihood per document is in exponential family:
where
and (2) we have a conjugate prior over β k :
for k = {1, . . . , K}. For simplicity, we assume hyperparameters α and η are set manually. Under the LDA model, we assume the variational posteriors are given by
, with variational parameters for capturing the posterior topic assignment,
• Dirichlet :
where these two distributions are computed in the E-step behind the privacy wall. The expected sufficient statistics
n φ k dn w dn due to Eq. 19. Then, in the M-step, we compute the posterior
VIPS for LDA
Following the general framework of VIPS, we perturb the expected sufficient statistics for differentially private LDA. While each document has a different document length N d , we limit the maximum length of any document to N by randomly selecting N words in a document if the number of words in the document is longer than N . We add Gaussian noise to each coordinate, then map to 0 if the perturbed coordinate becomes negative:
where s v k is the vth coordinate of a vector of length V :
, and ∆s is the sensitivity given by ∆s = max
since 0 ≤ φ k dn ≤ 1, k φ k dn = 1, v w v dn = 1, and w v dn ∈ {0, 1}. The resulting algorithm is summarised in Algorithm 3.
Experiments using Wikipedia data
We randomly downloaded D = 400, 000 documents from Wikipedia. We then tested our VIPS algorithm on the Wikipedia dataset with four different values of total privacy budget,
Define ρ t = (τ 0 + t) −κ , mini-batch size S, and , and hyperparameters α, η. Output: Privatised expected natural parameters log β k q(β k ) and sufficient statisticss.
Compute the per-iteration privacy budget ( iter , δ iter ) using Table 1 .
Compute the sensitivity of the expected sufficient statistics given in Eq. 21. for t = 1, . . . , J do (1) E-step: Given expected natural parameters log β k q(
Output expected natural parameters log β k q(β k ) . end for using a mini-batch size S = 10, until the algorithm sees up to 160, 000 documents. We assumed there are 100 topics, and we used a vocabulary set of approximately 8000 terms.
We compare our method to two baseline methods. First, in linear (Lin) composition (Theorem 3.16 of Dwork and Roth (2014) ), privacy degrades linearly with the number of iterations. This result is from the Max Divergence of the privacy loss random variable being bounded by a total budget. Hence, the linear composition yields (J , Jδ )-DP. We use Eq. 16 to map ( , δ ) to ( iter , δ iter ). Second, advanced (Adv) composition (Theorem 3.20 of Dwork and Roth (2014) ), resulting from the Max Divergence of the privacy loss random variable being bounded by a total budget including a slack variable δ, yields (J (e − 1) + 2J log(1/δ ) , δ + Jδ )-DP. Similarly, we use Eq. 16 to map ( , δ ) to ( iter , δ iter ).
As an evaluation metric, we compute the upper bound to the perplexity on held-out documents, 4
where n test i is a vector of word counts for the ith document, n test = {n test i } I i=1 . In the above, we use the λ that was calculated during training. We compute the posteriors over z and θ by performing the first step in our algorithm using the test data and the perturbed sufficient statistics we obtain during training. The per-word-perplexity is shown in Fig. 2 .
In Table 2 , we show the top 10 words in terms of assigned probabilities under a chosen topic in each method. We show 4 topics as examples. Non-private LDA results in the most Figure 2: Per-word-perplexity as a function of the number of documents seen (up to 160, 000). Data: D = 400, 000 documents randomly selected from Wikipedia. We tested four different values of total privacy budget tot ∈ {0.5, 1, 2, 4} with a fixed mini-batch size S = 10 and a fixed total tolerance δ tot = 1e−4. The non-private LDA (black trace) achieves the lowest perplexity. The zCDP composition (red trace) requires adding the least amount of noise per iteration for the same expected total privacy budget compared to the advanced composition (green trace) and the linear composition (blue trace).
coherent words among all the methods. For the private LDA models with a total privacy budget fixed to 0.5, as we move from zCDP, to advanced, and to linear composition, the amount of noise added gets larger, and therefore the topics become less coherent.
Using the same data, we then tested how perplexity changes as we change the mini-batch sizes. As shown in Fig. 3 , due to privacy amplification, it is more beneficial to decrease the amount of noise to add when the mini-batch size is small. The zCDP composition results in a better accuracy than the advanced composition. In the private LDA (Top/Right and Bottom), smaller mini-batch size achieves lower perplexity, due to the privacy amplification lemma (See Sec 3). We set the total privacy budget tot = 1 and the total tolerance δ tot = 1e − 4 in all private methods. Regardless of the mini-batch size, the zCDP composition (Top/Right) achieves a lower perplexity than the advanced (Bottom/Left) and linear compositions (Bottom/Right).
VIPS for non-CE family
Under non-CE family models, the complete-data likelihood typically has the following form:
which includes some function h(m, s(D n , l n )) that cannot be split into two functions, where one is a function of only m and the other is a function of only s(D n , l n ). Hence, we cannot apply the general VIPS framework we described in the previous section to this case. However, when the models we consider have binomial likelihoods, for instance, under negative binomial regression, nonlinear mixed-effects models, spatial models for count data, and logistic regression, we can bring the non-CE models to the CE family by adopting the Pólya-Gamma data augmentation strategy introduced by Polson et al. (2013) .
Pólya-Gamma data augmentation Pólya-Gamma data augmentation introduces an auxiliary variable that is Pólya-Gamma distributed per datapoint, such that the log-odds can be written as mixtures of Gaussians with respect to a Pólya-Gamma distribution, as stated in Theorem 1 in (Polson et al., 2013) :
where ψ n is a linear function in model parameters m, y n is the nth observation, and ξ n is a Pólya-Gamma random variable, ξ n ∼ PG(b, 0) where b > 0. For example, ψ n = m x n for models without latent variables and x n is the nth input vector, or ψ n = m l n for models with latent variables in unsupervised learning. Note that b is set depending on which binomial model one uses. For example, b = 1 in logistic regression. When ψ n = l n m and b = 1, we express the likelihood as:
By introducing a variational posterior over the auxiliary variables, we introduce a new objective function (See Appendix A for derivation)
The first derivative of the lower lower bound with respect to q(ξ n ) gives us a closed form update rule
The rest updates for q(l n )q(m) follow the standard updates under the conjugate exponential family distributions, since the lower bound to the conditional likelihood term includes only linear and quadratic terms both in l n and m. By introducing the auxiliary variables, the complete-data likelihood conditioned on ξ n (with some prior on l n ) now has the form of
which consists of natural parameters and sufficient statistics given by
Note that now not only the latent and observed variables but also the new variables ξ i form the complete-data sufficient statistics. The resulting variational Bayes algorithm for models with binomial likelihoods is given by (a) Given the expected natural parametersn, the E-step yields :
where q(ξ n ) = PG(1, l i mm l n q(l n,m ) ), and p(ξ n ) = PG(1, 0) (29)
Using
Given the expected sufficient statisticss, the M-step yields :
Using q(m), it outputs the expected natural parametersn := n(m) q(m) .
Similar to the VIPS algorithm for the CE family, perturbing the expected sufficient statistics s(D) in the E-step suffices for privatising all the outputs of the algorithm. Algorithm 4 summarizes private stochastic variational Bayes algorithm for non-CE family with binomial likelihoods.
Algorithm 4 ( tot , δ tot )-DP VIPS for non-CE family with binomial likelihoods Input: Data D. Define ρ t = (τ 0 + t) −κ , mini-batch size S, and maximum iterations J. Output: Perturb expected natural parametersñ and expected sufficient statss.
Compute the per-iteration privacy budget ( iter , δ iter ) using Table 1 . Compute the sensitivity of the expected sufficient statistics. for t = 1, . . . , J do (1) E-step: Given expected natural parametersn, compute q(l n )q(ξ n ) for n = 1, . . . , S. Perturb each coordinate ofs =
by Eq. 13, and outputs.
(2) M-step: Givens, compute q(m) byν (t) = ν+Ns. Setν (t) ← (1−ρ t )ν (t−1) +ρ tν (t) . Output the expected natural parametersñ = m q(m) . end for As a side note, in order to use the variational lower bound as a stopping criterion, one needs to draw samples from the Pólya-Gamma posterior to numerically calculate the lower bound given in Eq. 25. This might be a problem if one does not have access to the Pólya-Gamma posterior, since our algorithm only outputs the perturbed expected sufficient statistics in the E-step (not the Pólya-Gamma posterior itself). However, one could use other stopping criteria, which do not require sampling from the Pólya-Gamma posterior, e.g., calculating the prediction accuracy in the classification case.
VIPS for Bayesian logistic regression
We present an example of non-CE family, Bayesian logistic regression, and illustrate how to employ the VIPS framework given in Algorithm 4 in such a case.
Model specifics
Under the logistic regression model with the Gaussian prior on the weights m ∈ R d ,
where σ(m x n ) = 1/(1 + exp(−m x n )), the nth input is x n ∈ R d , and the nth output is y n ∈ {0, 1}. In logistic regression, there are no latent variables. Hence, the complete-data likelihood coincides the data likelihood,
where ψ n = x n m. Since the likelihood is not in the CE family. We use the Pólya-Gamma data augmentation trick to re-write it as
and the data likelihood conditioned on ξ n is
where the natural parameters and sufficient statistics are given by
Variational Bayes in Bayesian logistic regression Using the likelihood given in Eq. 35, we compute the posterior distribution over m, α, ξ by maximising the following variational lower bound due to Eq. 25
In the E-step, we update
Algorithm 5 VIPS for Bayesian logistic regression
Input: Data D. Define ρ t = (τ 0 + t) −κ , mini-batch size S, and maximum iterations J Output: Privatised expected natural parametersñ and expected sufficient statisticss Compute the per-iteration privacy budget ( iter , δ iter ) using Table 1 . Using the sensitivity of the expected sufficient statistics given in Eq. 46 and Eq. 48, for t = 1, . . . , J do (1) E-step: Given expected natural parametersn, compute q(ξ n ) for n = 1, . . . , S.
by Eq. 45 and Eq. 47, and outputs. (2) M-step: Givens, compute q(m) byν (t) = ν+Ns. Setν (t) ← (1−ρ t )ν (t−1) +ρ tν (t) . Usingν (t) , update q(α) by Eq. 42, and outputñ = m q(m) . end for Using q(ξ), we compute the expected sufficient statistics
In the M-step, we compute q(m) and q(α) by
, and
Mapping fromν to (µ m , Σ m ) is deterministic, as below, wheres 1 = N n=1s 1 (D n ) and
Using q(m), we compute expected natural parameters
VIPS for Bayesian logistic regression
Following the general framework of VIPS, we perturb the expected sufficient statistics. For perturbings 1 , we add Gaussian noise to each coordinate,
where σ ≥ c∆s 1 / iter , c 2 > 2 log(1.25/δ iter ), and the sensitivity ∆s 1 is given by Figure 4: Posterior mean of each PG variable ξ i as a function of x i mm x i . The maximum value of ξ i is 0.25 when x n mm x n = 0, due to Eq. 11 and the assumption that the dataset is preprocessed such that any input has a maximum L2-norm of 1.
For perturbings 2 , we follow the analyze Gauss (AG) algorithm , which provides ( iter , δ iter )-DP. We first draw Gaussian random variables z ∼ N (0, βI) , where β = 2 log(1.25/δ iter )(∆s 2 ) 2 /( iter ) 2 . Using z, we construct a upper triangular matrix (including diagonal), then copy the upper part to the lower part so that the resulting matrix Z becomes symmetric. Then, we add this noisy matrix to the covariance matrix
The perturbed covariance might not be positive definite. In such case, we project the negative eigenvalues to some value near zero to maintain positive definiteness of the covariance matrix. The sensitivity ofs 2 in Frobenius norm is given by
due to Eq. 11 and the fact that the mean of a PG variable ξ n is given by
As shown in Fig. 4 , the maximum value is 0.25. Since there are two perturbations (one fors 1 and the other fors 2 ) in each iteration, when we calculate the per-iteration budget using Table 1 , we plug in 2J instead of the maximum iteration number J. Our VIPS algorithm for Bayesian logistic regression is given in Algorithm 5.
Experiments with Stroke data
We used the stroke dataset, which was first introduced by Letham et al. (2014) for predicting the occurrence of a stroke within a year after an atrial fibrillation diagnosis. 5 There are 5. The authors extracted every patient in the MarketScan Medicaid Multi-State Database (MDCD) with a diagnosis of atrial fibrillation, one year of observation time prior to the diagnosis, and one year of observation time following the diagnosis.
Area Under the Curve (AUC) on test data
Figure 5: Stroke data. Comparison between our method and private/non-private ERM, for different tot ∈ {0.5, 1, 2, 4}. For the non-private methods, non-private BLR (black square marker) and ERM (black circle marker) achieved a similar AUC, which is higher than AUC obtained by any other private methods. Our method (red) under BLR with zCDP composition with δ = 0.0001 achieved the highest AUCs regardless of tot among all the other private methods. The private version of ERM (objective perturbation, green) performed worse than BRL with advanced composition as well as BRL with zCDP composition. While directly comparing these to the private ERM is not totally fair since the private ERM (pERM) is -DP while others are ( , δ)-DP, we show the difference between them in order to contrast the relative gain of our method compared to the existing method. N = 12, 586 patients in this dataset, and among these patients, 1,786 (14%) had a stroke within a year of the atrial fibrillation diagnosis. Following Letham et al. (2014) , we also considered all drugs and all medical conditions of these patients as candidate predictors. A binary predictor variable is used for indicating the presence or absence of each drug or condition in the longitudinal record prior to the atrial fibrillation diagnosis. In addition, a pair of binary variables is used for indicating age and gender. These totalled d = 4, 146 unique features for medications and conditions. We randomly shuffled the data to make 5 pairs of training and test sets. For each set, we used 10, 069 patients' records as training data and the rest as test data.
Using this dataset, we first ran our VIPS algorithm in batch mode, i.e., using the entire training data in each iteration, as opposed to using a small subset of data. We also ran the private and non-private empirical risk minimisation (ERM) algorithms (Chaudhuri et al., 2011a) , in which we performed 5-fold cross-validation to set the regularisation constant
# iterations
Nonpriv_b (N=10069) zCDP_b (eps=2) zCDP_b (eps=1) Adv_b (eps=2) Adv_b ( given each training/test pair. As a performance measure, we calculated the area under the curve (AUC) on each test data, given the posteriors over the latent and parameters in case of BLR and the parameter estimate in case of ERM. In Fig. 5 , we show the mean and 1-standard deviation of the AUCs obtained by each method.
Next, we ran our stochastic VIPS algorithm with a mini-batch size S = 10, until the algorithm sees 4000 datapoints (i.e., J = 400 iterations). In Fig. 6 , we show the median of the AUCs calculated on the 5 test sets, given parameter estimates obtained by each method. Thanks to the privacy amplification effect as well as the refined composition by zCDP, the stochastic version of our method with zCDP composition given a total privacy budget tot = 0.2 achieves as high prediction accuracy as the batch version of our method given a total privacy budget tot = 2, although the stochastic version used less than half (i.e., N = 4000) the data the batch version used (i.e., N = 10, 069). 
VIPS for sigmoid belief networks
As a last example model, we consider the sigmoid belief network (SBN) model, which as first introduced in Neal (1992), for modeling N binary observations in terms of binary hidden variables and some parameters shown as Fig. 7 . The complete-data likelihood for the nth observation and latent variables is given by
where we view the latent variables l n = z n and model parameters m = θ, and each datapoint D n = y n . Thanks to the Pólya-Gamma data augmentation strategy, we can rewrite the completedata likelihood from
where we denote ψ n,j = w j z n + c j , to
where each element of vectors ξ
i ∈ R J and ξ (1) ∈ R K is from PG(1, 0). Using the notations ψ n ∈ R J where ψ n = W z n + c, W = [w 1 , · · · , w J ] ∈ R J×K , and 1 J is a vector of J ones, we obtain p(y n , z n |ξ
Algorithm 6 VIPS for sigmoid belief networks
Input: Data D. Define ρ t = (τ 0 + t) −κ , mini-batch size S, and maximum iterations T Output: Privatised expected natural parametersñ and expected sufficient statisticss Compute the per-iteration privacy budget ( iter , δ iter ) using Table 1 . for t = 1, . . . , T do (1) E-step: Given expected natural parametersn, compute q(ξ
n ) for n = 1, . . . , S. Givenn, compute q(ξ (1) ) for n = 1, . . . , S. Givenn, q(ξ (0) n ) and q(ξ (1) ), compute q(z n ) for n = 1, . . . , S.
by Appendix B, and outputs.
(2) M-step: Givens, compute q(m) byν (t) = ν+Ns. Setν (t) ← (1−ρ t )ν (t−1) +ρ tν (t) . Usingν (t) , update variational posteriors for hyper-priors by Appendix C, and output n = m q(m) .
end for
The complete-data likelihood given the PG variables provides the exponential family form
Now the PG variables form a set of sufficient statistics, which is separated from the model parameters. Similar to logistic regression, in the E-step, we compute the posterior over ξ and z, and output perturbed expected sufficient statistics. The closed-form update of the posteriors over the PG variables is simply
The posterior over the latent variables is given by
Now, using q(z) and q(ξ), we compute the expected sufficient statistics.
Using the variational posterior distributions in the E-step, we perturb and output each sufficient statistic. See Appendix B for the descriptions on how we perturbed each of these expected sufficient statistics.
While running the stochastic variational inference algorithm (Algorithm 6) for T iterations, we need to perturb (1)s 1 ,s 3 ,s 4 ,s 5 ,s 6 T times; (3) each coordinate ofs 2 T times (for K coordinates); and (4) each matrix ofs 7 T times (for J matrices). This means, we need to divide our privacy budget into (5 + J + K)T perturbations. As before, we calculate the per-perturbation privacy budget under this scenario using Table 1 .
While any conjugate priors are acceptable, following Gan et al. (2015) , we put three parameter beta normal (TPBN) prior for W
to induce sparsity, and isotropic normal priors for b and c: b ∼ N (0, ν b I K ), c ∼ N (0, ν c I J ), assuming these hyperparameters are set such that the prior is broad. The M-step updates for the variational posteriors for the parameters as well as for the hyper-parameters are given in Appendix C. It is worth noting that these posterior updates for the hyper-parameters are one step away from the data, meaning that the posterior updates for the hyper-parameters are functions of variational posteriors that are already perturbed due to the perturbations in the expected natural parameters and expected sufficient statistics. Hence, we do not need any additional perturbation in the posteriors for the hyper-parameters.
Experiments with MNIST data
We tested our VIPS algorithm for the SBN model on the MNIST digit dataset which contains 60,000 training images of ten handwritten digits (0 to 9), where each image consists 
B.
Adv (1) zCDP ( Each image shows each reshaped column of W (reshaped as 28 × 28, which is the same as the size of each image). We can easily identify the style of hand-written digits as well as the digits themselves in the training data. B: The posterior mean of W under our VIPS algorithm with zCDP composition. Many of the columns are hard to identify, due to the noise addition step in our algorithm. However, in some columns, we can vaguely identify the style of hand-written digits and the digits themselves in the training data. C: The posterior mean of W under our VIPS algorithm with zCDP composition. Almost all the columns are hard to identify, due to the significant noise addition. different numbers of hidden units, K = {50, 100}. 6 We tested two different total privacy budget tot = {0.5, 1} for zCDP and advanced compositions. We varied the mini-batch size S = {50, 100, 200}. We tested the non-private version of VIPS as well as the private versions with advanced and zCDP compositions, where each algorithm was run 10 times with different seed numbers. As a performance measure, we calculated the pixel-wise prediction accuracy by first converting the pixels of reconstructed images into probabilities (between 0 and 1); then converting the probabilities into binary variables; and averaging the squared distances between the predicted binary variables and the test images. In each seed number, we selected 100 randomly selected test images from 10, 000 test datapoints. Fig. 8 shows the performance of each method in terms of prediction accuracy. Fig. 9 shows the estimated weight matrices obtained by each method.
Discussion
We have developed a practical privacy-preserving VB algorithm which outputs accurate and privatized expected sufficient statistics and expected natural parameters. Our approach uses the zCDP composition analysis combined with the privacy amplification effect due to subsampling of data, which significantly decrease the amount of additive noise for the 6. We chose these two numbers since when K is larger than 100, the variational lower bound on the test data, shown in Figure 2 in (Gan et al., 2015) , does not increase significantly.
same expected privacy guarantee compared to the standard analysis. Our methods show how to perform variational Bayes inference in private settings, not only for the conjugate exponential family models but also for non-conjugate models with binomial likelihoods using the Polyá Gamma data augmentation. We illustrated the effectiveness of our algorithm on several real-world datasets. The private VB algorithms for the latent Dirichlet allocation (LDA), Bayesian logistic regression (BLR), and sigmoid belief network (SBN) models we discussed are just a few examples of a much broader class of models to which our private VB framework applies. Our positive empirical results with VB indicate that these ideas are also likely to be beneficial for privatizing many other iterative machine learning algorithms. In future work, we plan to apply this general framework to other inference methods for larger and more complicated models such as deep neural networks. More broadly, our vision is that practical privacy preserving machine learning algorithms will have a transformative impact on the practice of data science in many real-world applications.
The variational lower bound (per-datapoint for simplicity) given by
where the first term can be re-written using Eq. 24, q(m)q(l n ) log p(D n |l n , m)dl n dm = −b log 2 + (y n − b 2 ) l n q(l n) m q(m) + q(m)q(l n ) log ∞ 0 exp(− 1 2 ξ n l n mm l n )p(ξ n )dξ n .
We rewrite the third term using q(ξ n ), the variational posterior distribution for ξ n , q(m)q(l n ) log
2 ξ n q(ξn) l n mm l n q(l n)q(m ) − D KL (q(ξ n )||p(ξ n )),
which gives us a lower lower bound to the log likelihood, L n (q(m), q(l n )) ≥ L n (q(m), q(l n ), q(ξ n ))
:= −b log 2 + (y n − b 2 ) l n q(l n) m q(m) − 1 2 ξ n q(ξn) l n mm l n q(l n)q(m ) , − D KL (q(ξ n )||p(ξ n )) − D KL (q(m)||p(m)) − D KL (q(l n )||p(l n )), which implies that q(m)q(l n )q(ξ n ) log p(D n |l n , ξ n , m) = −b log 2 + (y n − b 2 ) l n q(l n) m q(m) − 1 2 ξ n q(ξn) l n mm l n q(l n)q(m ) . 
due to Eq. 11 and the fact that z n is a vector of Bernoulli random variables (length K) and the mean of each element is σ(d n,k ) as given in Eq. 57.
• For perturbings 2 , we perturb B = ξ (1) , the part before taking diag and vec operations.B = B + (Y 1 , · · · , Y K ), where Y k ∼ N (0, σ 2 k ), σ k ≥ c∆B/ iter and c 2 > 2 log(1.25/δ iter ). Here, ∆B ≤ 0.25 as shown in Fig. 4. • For perturbings 3 , we perturb C = 
since y n is a binary vector of length J. Note that when performing the batch optimisation, we perturbs 3 only once, since this quantity remains the same across iterations. However, when the stochastic optimisation, we perturbs 3 in every iteration, since the new mini-batch of data is selected in every iteration.
• For perturbings 4 , we perturb D = 
• Fors 6 , we can use the noisys 1 for the second term, but perturb only the first term F = 1 N N n=1 y n z n . This term in fact will appear in the M-step, as J separate terms where each term is F j = 1 N N n=1 y n,j z n (see the mean update for W ), where F j ∈ R K . We perturb the entire matrix F ∈ R K×J byF = F + (Y 1,1 , · · · , Y J,K ), where Y j,k ∼ i.i.d. N (0, σ 2 ), σ ≥ c∆F/ iter and c 2 > 2 log(1.25/δ iter ). The sensitivity is given by (due to Eq. 11)
• This terms 7 will appear in the M-step, as J separate matrices where each matrix is
n,j z n z n (see the covariance update for W ), where G j ∈ R K×K . For perturbing each symmetric positive definite matrix G j , we follow the analyze Gauss (AG) algorithm, which provides ( iter , δ iter )-DP. We first draw Gaussian random variables η ∼ N 0, βI K(K+1)/2 ,
where β = 2 log(1.25/δ iter )(∆G j ) 2 /( iter ) 2 . Using z, we construct a upper triangular matrix (including diagonal), then copy the upper part to the lower part so that the resulting matrix Z becomes symmetric. Then, we add this noisy matrix to the covariance matrixG
The perturbed covariance might not be positive definite. In such case, we project the negative eigenvalues to some value near zero to maintain positive definiteness of the covariance matrix. The sensitivity of E j is given by (due to Eq. 11)
The M-step updates are given below (taken from (Gan et al., 2015) ):
• q(W ) = J j=1 q(w j ), and q(w j ) = N (µ j , Σ j ), where
n,j q(ξ) z n z n + diag( ζ 
where we replace ξ (1) and 1 N N n=1 z n q(z) with perturbed expected sufficient statistics.
• q(c) = N (µ c , Σ c ), where
where we replace • TPBN shrinkage priors: q(ζ j,k ) = GIG(0, 2 ξ j,k q(ξ) , w φ k q(φ) ).
When updating these TPBN shrinkage priors, we first calculate q(ζ j,k ) using a dataindependent initial value for 2 ξ j,k q(ξ) and perturb w 2 j,k q(θ) (since q(c) is perturbed). Using this perturbed q(ζ j,k ), we calculate q(ξ j,k ). Then, using q(ξ j,k ), we calculate q(φ k ) with some data-independent initial value for ω q(ω) . Then, finally, we update q(ω) using q(φ k ). In this way, these TPBN shrinkage priors are perturbed.
